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INTRODUCTION 
During his eight years in office, President Barack Obama changed 
the face of the federal judiciary. A total of 331 of his federal judicial 
nominees were confirmed, a larger number (by one) than President 
George W. Bush had confirmed during his eight year term.1 At the time 
that Donald J. Trump became the President of the United States in 
January of 2017, approximately two-thirds of federal district court 
judges and approximately half of federal circuit judges had been 
nominated by Democratic presidents.2 Several Obama nominees have 
the promise to be major voices on the federal bench for decades to 
come.3 President Obama successfully nominated two justices to the 
  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of 
Law. My thanks to the Wisconsin Law Review for their invitation to participate in this 
symposium. A disclaimer: I participated in various capacities in many of these 
nominations controversies, and have written about many of them for popular audiences. 
One of the goals of this Essay is to provide some theoretical heft to tie together a lot of 
what I have been doing for and writing about for larger audiences. For their comments 
on this Essay, I would like to thank Michael Abramowicz, Thomas Colby, Aziz Huq, 
Orin Kerr, and Peter Smith. For many discussions over the years on these issues, 
special thanks to Micah Schwartzman.   
1. See Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/apptsbypres_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RNL-
6452] (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
2. Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More Than 100 Court
Vacancies, Plans to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-court-
vacancies-plans-to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/25/d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b5-
76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.dce24dc0ebe5 [https://perma.cc/GG79-EEAK]. 
3. See David Fontana, Obama Has Started Making Major Progress on
Nominating Judges—and This Is His Most Important One Yet, NEW REPUBLIC (May 13, 
2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117747/pamela-harris-fourth-circuit-court-why-
liberals-should-cheer-her [https://perma.cc/E3E7-HNLP] (identifying Fourth Circuit 
Judge Pamela Harris as an important nominee); David Fontana, Obama’s Shocking 
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FONTANA  – FORTHCOMING  – WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW (2017) 3/28/2017 
102 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Supreme Court, both of whom (in different ways) have the potential to 
contribute to the liberal jurisprudential cause for many years to come.4 
President Obama’s federal judicial nominees were the most diverse 
along many dimensions of any president in the history of the United 
States.5 Some of these accomplishments were made possible by the 
controversial decision by Senate Democrats in 2013 to abolish the 
filibuster for lower court nominations.6 
The perfect should not be the enemy of the good, but the good 
enough should not distract progressives from what could have been 
better for their judicial agenda. President Obama did a lot for the 
federal courts, but could have done more. President Trump inherited 
103 judicial vacancies from President Obama, almost twice the amount 
President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush.7 Empirical 
measures suggest that President Obama’s nominees were more 
moderate, as compared to the more ideologically conservative nature of 
the nominees of past Republican presidents.8 This was true even after 
 
Success on Judicial Nominations Overturns Conventional Wisdom, DAILY BEAST (June 
9, 2014, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/09/obama-s-
shocking-success-on-judgeships-overturns-conventional-wisdom.html 
[https://perma.cc/7C4Q-PC5G] (identifying First Circuit Judge David Barron, Ninth 
Circuit Judge Michelle Friedland, and Southern District of New York Judges Jesse 
Furman and Allison Nathan as future liberal judicial superstars). 
 4.  See David Fontana, The Obama Justices: Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan Represent Conflicting Styles of Liberalism—Or Are They  
Complementary?, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/01/obama_s_supre
me_court_justices_elena_kagan_and_sonia_sotomayor_have_elite.html 
[https://perma.cc/X9U7-FV3E]. 
 5.  See Donna Owens, Obama’s Legacy on Judicial Appointments, By the 
Numbers, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 9:21 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-obama-the-legacy/obama-s-legacy-
judicial-appointments-numbers-n709306 [https://perma.cc/CD58-VWLX] (“The more 
than 300 Obama-nominated judges are considered to be the most diverse group in 
U.S. history in terms of terms of gender, ethnicity, and nationality.”). 
 6.  See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits  
Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-
of-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/5WYL-SLK7]. 
 7.  Rucker & Barnes, supra note 2. 
 8.  See Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged By The Company You Keep: An 
Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 
B.C. L. Rev. 1133, 1133 (2010) (“[I]n general judges appointed by Republican 
presidents were more ideological than those appointed by Democratic presidents.”); 
Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the 
Supreme Court Into A Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 6) (“Our analysis shows that the growing ideological gap between 
Democratic-appointed justices and Republican-appointed justices is largely attributable 
to the appointment of conservative Republican nominees.”).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942297 
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the elimination of the Senate filibuster constrained the Republican 
Senators for two years (before they took back the Senate majority).9 
 Many of the superstars of the liberal legal movement often 
identified as having transformative potential—Pamela Karlan or 
Goodwin Liu, to name two—remain either not on the bench at all or 
were appointed by Democratic Governors to state judicial positions.10 
Consider, by contrast, that during the terms of the past three 
Republican presidents, many of the most jurisprudentially influential 
(and youngest) conservative lawyers had been successfully nominated to 
the federal bench.11 
This Essay argues that the tactical roots of these failures to do 
more on judicial nominations during the Obama Administration reside 
in a common tactical error made by political leaders in the Democratic 
Party: excessive cooperation with political forces that do not manifest 
the same behavioral patterns of cooperation.12 The Obama 
 
 9.  See Christina L. Boyd, Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna, 
Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial 
Nominations, 13 FORUM 623 (2015). 
 10.  See Howard Mintz, Goodwin Liu Confirmed to California Supreme 
Court, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 31, 2011, 10:21 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/08/31/goodwin-liu-confirmed-to-california-
supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/Z4GJ-JDVG]; Jeffery Toobin, A Sharp Progressive 
Joins the D.O.J., NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-sharp-progressive-joins-the-d-o-j 
[https://perma.cc/3G6M-5LDU]. 
 11.  See David Fontana & Micah Schwartzman, Old World, NEW REPUBLIC 
(July 17, 2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/62573/old-world 
[https://perma.cc/XEY4-PPAD] (“[R]oughly a quarter of the circuit-court nominees put 
forward by the past three Republican presidents . . . were below the age of 45. Reagan 
nominated some of the brightest young legal minds in the country, including Alex 
Kozinski (then 34), Frank Easterbrook (36), Kenneth Starr (37), J. Harvie Wilkinson 
(39), Doug Ginsburg (40), and Richard Posner (42). The first President Bush nominated 
Michael Luttig (36), Samuel Alito (39), and Clarence Thomas (41). And George W. 
Bush continued this practice, nominating Neil Gorsuch (38), Brett Kavanaugh (41), 
Raymond Kethledge (41), Jeffrey Sutton (42), and William Pryor (42), among others.”). 
 12.  For a general discussion of the differing organizational purposes of the 
two political parties, and the behavioral manifestations of these differences, see MATT 
GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS 
AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS (2016); Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 327 (1986); Matt Grossmann & 
David A. Hopkins, Ideological Republicans and Interest Group Democrats: The 
Asymmetry of American Party Politics, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 119 (2015). See also Matt 
Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, More Proof That Republicans Are From Mars and 
Democrats Are From Venus, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/10/more-proof-that-
republicans-are-from-mars-and-democrats-are-from-venus/?utm_term=.a965c8ad357e 
[https://perma.cc/P79Q-8JJ5] (summarizing this research by stating that “[t]he 
Republican Party . . . is best understood as the agent of an ideological movement 
dedicated to advancing the cause of conservatism. . . . The Democratic Party, in 
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Administration did not avail itself of a supply side of uncooperative 
tools used to approach judicial nominations, and focused mostly on 
cooperative approaches to judicial nominations.  The Obama 
Administration’s approach to judicial nominations, in other words, 
featured asymmetric usage of “constitutional hardball”13 or 
“constitutional showdowns.”14 In addition to the tactical argument, this 
Essay has a taxonomical goal. Judicial nominations are a unique field of 
political activity,15 in which a series of more aggressive political 
strategies have emerged, yet have not previously been identified and 
described. For both the tactical and the taxonomical, the goal is to take 
a step back from the day-to-day politics of judicial nominations to make 
some larger, more theoretical observations about the eight years of 
judicial nominations by the Obama Administration that will shed some 
light to inform later presidencies. 
In game theoretic terms, the closest way to explain this would be 
as follows. Engaging in a non-cooperative strategy with a cooperative 
opponent yields a suboptimal result.16 There are not the political costs 
contrast, is best understood as a coalition of social groups seeking various forms of 
government action. Most Democratic supporters in the mass public are attracted to the 
party for reasons of group interest or identity rather than a devotion to the principles of 
liberalism.”). In the context of judicial nominations, see Lawrence Baum & Neal 
Devins, Ideological Imbalance: Why Democrats Usually Pick Moderate-Liberal Justices 
and Republicans Usually Pick Conservative Ones, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2016, 2:33 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/democrats_alw
ays_pick_moderates_like_merrick_garland.html [https://perma.cc/B77D-GXAU] 
(“Democrats Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were careful to choose nominees who 
stood on the liberal side of the ideological spectrum. But at the same time, they veered 
away from candidates whose strong liberalism would prompt confirmation battles and 
toward nominees who embraced the rhetoric of judicial restraint, had rich personal 
histories, and were perceived as less ideological.”). 
13. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523,
523 (2004) (defining constitutional hardball as “consist[ing] of political claims and 
practices that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional 
doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-
constitutional understandings”). 
14. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008) (defining constitutional showdowns as featuring “a 
disagreement between branches of government over their constitutional powers that 
ends in the total or partial acquiescence by one branch in the views of the other and that 
creates a constitutional precedent”). 
15. A sociologist would refer to judicial nominations as a “field.” See Neil
Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and Its Application to Corporate Governance, 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 237, 242 (2016) (featuring a description by a leading sociologist of 
a field as a “socially constructed arena[] within which individuals or groups with 
differing resource endowments vie for advantage”) (citations omitted). 
16. See Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in
Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 781–82 (2011) (summarizing the difference 
between cooperative and non-cooperative games as being that “all noncooperative 
FONTANA – FORTHCOMING  – WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW (2017) 3/28/2017 
2017:N  Cooperative Judicial Nominations 105 
for being aggressive that existed before our age of polarization, and 
indeed there are political benefits to being aggressive. Because the 
violation of cooperative norms generates a greater backlash by 
opponents and supporters alike—without the political resources 
necessary to overcome those greater political costs—non-cooperative 
strategies fail in a largely cooperative environment for three related 
reasons.17 In the context of judicial nominations, the assumption was 
that Republican Senators and affiliated interest groups were not engaged 
in “empire-building government.”18 A more aggressive strategy by the 
Obama Administration would therefore have generated additional 
political costs by antagonizing the opposition.19 Second, these direct 
political costs generate additional opportunity costs.20 Political 
resources spent overcoming Senate obstruction—both public and 
private21—are political resources not spent on ensuring the enactment of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide health care 
 
games . . . must be described as involving no agreement. . . . [I]f there is an 
agreement, we by definition have a cooperative game, but it was stipulated that the 
game is noncooperative”). 
 17.  See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just 
Backlash? Evidence From A National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 766 
(2012) (identifying the arguments behind cooperative strategies). 
 18.  Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (2005) (“A[n] . . . enduring and pervasive assumption in 
constitutional law and theory is that much government behavior is driven by empire-
building, the self-aggrandizing pursuit of power or wealth.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Moderate Is Said To Be Pick for Court,  
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/politics/17nominate.html 
[https://perma.cc/S67Z-WDEL] (“The administration official said part of the reason for 
making the [David] Hamilton nomination [to the Seventh Circuit] the administration’s 
first public entry into the often contentious field of judicial selection was to serve ‘as a 
kind of signal’ about the kind of nominees Mr. Obama will select. The official spoke on 
the condition of anonymity because the nomination had not been officially made.”); 
Jeffrey Toobin, Bench Press, NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/bench-press 
[https://perma.cc/RZ7Z-258J] (“The hope was that Hamilton’s appointment would 
begin a profound and rapid change in the confirmation process and in the federal 
judiciary itself.”). 
 20.  See Michael Grunwald, Did Obama Win the Judicial Wars?, POLITICO 
(Aug. 8, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-courts-
judicial-legacy-226741 [https://perma.cc/YE7E-BN2J] (noting that “Obama’s first chief 
of staff, Rahm Emanuel, made it clear internally that he didn’t want to waste precious 
political capital on polarizing judges”). 
 21.  See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 181, 206 (1997) (“In most cases, the two-track system keeps filibusters out of the 
public eye.”); id. at 181 (“Filibusters are ubiquitous but virtually invisible, for the 
contemporary Senate practice does not require a senator to hold the floor to filibuster; 
senators filibuster simply by indicating to the Senate leadership that they intend to do 
so.”). 
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or a stimulus package to protect the economy. Third, the assumption is 
that there is not the same political energy and therefore not the same 
political resources within the Democratic Party on judicial nominations 
to overcome political costs as there is in the Republican Party.22 
Aggressive strategies generate new political enemies and no new—but 
much needed—political friends. 
However, judicial nominations have increasingly become a non-
cooperative environment in which non-cooperative strategies fare 
better. Now that both political parties are increasingly polarized, the 
incentives to cooperate with the other political party are much lower.23 
The result is that more and more fields of political action are dominated 
by political parties that do not respect traditional written and unwritten 
norms of cooperation. In this environment, non-cooperative strategies 
perform increasingly better. More aggressive strategies to accomplish 
more transformative outcomes generate the same political costs in terms 
of opposition as do less aggressive strategies. More aggressive 
strategies generate more political resources in terms of active and 
engaged support from political allies. 
The tactical argument for the possibilities generated by more 
aggressive approaches to judicial nominations is made in the context of 
a series of identifiable practices towards judicial nominations that have 
emerged in past presidential administrations, yet were relatively 
underutilized during the Obama Administration. These tactical tools are 
helpful whether the task is nominating a district court judge, a circuit 
court judge, or a Supreme Court Justice, and are helpful when 
controlling the Senate or facing a Senate controlled by the opposition 
party. 
I label these three tactical tools—visible outside of the nominations 
context as well—as naming, numbing, and numbers. Naming means an 
Administration selecting nominees that identify their jurisprudential 
perspective with a particular frame—such as originalism—and 
promoting these nominees by also using that name. Numbing means the 
open consideration and/or selection of unusually provocative judicial 
nominees that generate political extremeness aversion. The political 
 
 22.  See Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 
YALE L.J. 1699, 1699 (2006) (“In recent years, the initiative in constitutional debate 
has passed to the conservatives . . . . The liberals continue to win a significant share of 
victories, in such areas as homosexual rights, affirmative action, and capital 
punishment, but for the most part their stance, their outlook, has been defensive: 
defense of the Warren Court and Roe v. Wade.”). 
 23.  See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2332 (2006) (“[T]he two major parties today are as 
coherent and polarized as they have been in perhaps a century, and for reasons that are 
likely to endure.”). 
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system is distracted from other nominees by the controversial political 
or actual nominee, and other nominees are framed as less controversial 
because their views are distorted by comparison to the controversial 
potential or actual nominees. Numbers refers to the simultaneous 
nomination of a large number of judges to the federal bench. The 
volume of nominees precludes the opposition from being able to direct 
resources towards a critical mass of nominees, and also generates 
political pressure to confirm a critical mass so as to avoid being labeled 
as obstructing the Senate. 
Two caveats are worth making. First, it could be that the Obama 
Administration’s record on judicial nominations was a purposefully lost 
opportunity, in that the nature and number of its nominees reflected 
genuinely revealed preferences of the President leading the efforts of 
the Administration. President Obama himself wrote before becoming 
President24—and indicated when he was President25—that he was quite 
content with a more limited role for the federal courts and therefore a 
more limited focus on judicial nominations. Scholars affiliated with the 
political left had spent at least a decade before President Obama took 
office in 2009 exploring the theoretical merits of “taking the 
Constitution away from the courts”26 and focusing increasingly on 
popular constitutionalism.27 The Obama Administration, though, 
featured its share of cause lawyers inside the Administration and liberal 
groups outside of the Administration advocating for efforts to shape the 
federal bench.28 Later Democratic Administrations surely will feature 
those constituencies as well. This Essay is meant to provide a tactical 
roadmap to frame their approach. 
 
 24.  See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON 
RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 83 (2006) (“[I]n our reliance on the courts to 
vindicate not only our rights but also our values, progressives had lost too much faith in 
democracy.”). 
 25.  See Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief: The President Considers His 
Judicial Legacy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014),  
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief 
[https://perma.cc/R4NG-YREY] (quoting Obama as stating that “[t]he bulk of my 
nominees, twenty years ago or even ten years ago, would have been considered very 
much centrists, well within the mainstream of American jurisprudence, not particularly 
fire-breathing or ideologically driven”). 
 26.  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999). 
 27.  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1043 (2004) (“The 
danger of judicial supremacy is not that the people will be deprived of the authority to 
decide a particular case, but rather that they will cease to maintain a vibrant and 
energetic engagement with the process of constitutional self-governance.”). 
 28.  See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority 
in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 115 (2014).  
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Second, this Essay is about the boundaries of the possible, not the 
desirability of the possible. The goal is to identify the possibilities for 
Democratic Presidents wishing to prioritize judicial nominations, and 
the tactical approaches to achieve these possibilities that are often 
neglected in scholarly and public discussions. Identifying more 
aggressive strategies that could have worked is not the same as saying 
these strategies should be utilized all things considered. A complete 
normative evaluation of uncooperative approaches to judicial 
nominations would have to consider, for instance, whether 
uncooperative behavior is justified as a tactical response to initially 
uncooperative behavior, or whether the damage to our institutional 
norms generated by any uncooperative behavior is too great.29 
I. NAMING 
Judicial nominations are a unique occasion to define and promote 
the jurisprudential vision that a presidential administration desires—to 
name that vision. The large stakes involved in judicial nominations 
means that nominations serve as a focal point to coordinate legal 
activities and construct a name for the associated jurisprudential vision. 
The microphone provided by the stakes of judicial nominations provides 
an occasion to promote that name and the associated jurisprudential 
vision. Naming does not generate any additional opposition to nominees 
in the Senate, because senators will often pin names on nominees not 
deserving of such labels. Naming does, though, mobilize political 
resources behind a judicial nominee and the President promoting that 
nominee. 
The act of naming the jurisprudential vision that a presidential 
administration wishes to promote is a crucial part of promoting the 
success of that jurisprudential vision. Scholars in the social sciences 
have often referred to this act of naming as constructing a “frame,” or 
a “schemata of interpretation” that encourages people to “locate, 
perceive, identify and label” experiences and events into a coherent 
whole.30 Framing a jurisprudential vision in terms of a singular name 
“provide[s] a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects 
 
 29.  The larger theoretical issue this raises was framed by David Pozen’s 
important article. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 
YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2014) (considering “when . . . officials in one branch of the federal 
government [can] attempt to redress another branch's perceived wrong through means 
that, but for that wrongdoing, would be impermissible”). 
 30.  ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION 
OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974). 
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patterns or happenings in the world.”31 This name will provide a 
diagnosis (what past wrong the new vision is trying to remedy), a 
prognosis (identifying the tools that will be used to implement that 
remedy), and a motivation (suggesting why the stakes of this remedy 
are so important).32 
Naming plays several constructive roles for a presidential 
administration. Administrations rely on tools like the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to coordinate executive 
actions.33 Naming plays a similar function as an OIRA directive: it 
minimizes agency costs within a presidential administration by 
suggesting to disparate officials within the administration what the legal 
ambitions of the administration are. The lawyer in the White House 
evaluating nominees to the federal courts and the lawyer arguing a case 
from the Civil Appellate Division of the Department of Justice both 
know they are bound by the jurisprudential vision reflected in that 
name.34 Names can feature ambiguities, to be sure, but administrations 
can engage in efforts to remove those ambiguities and ensure a more 
faithful implementation of the jurisprudential vision. The most dramatic 
illustration of this was promulgation by the Office of Legal Policy in 
the Department of Justice during the Reagan Administration of the 
Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation and The Constitution in the Year 
2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation, both of which 
provided more granular guidance to the executive branch about 
constitutional choices.35 
Naming tries to persuade members of the public of the merits of 
the jurisprudential vision of the presidential administration.36 Members 
 
 31.  See David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of 
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 138 (Aldon D. Morris & 
Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992). 
 32.  Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 615 (2000). 
 33.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2277–90 (2001). 
 34.  See Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers 
and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 66 (2009) 
(noting how the Reagan Administration used the originalism vision to coordinate 
personnel selection and action across the government). 
 35.  For a discussion of the nature and significance of these documents, see 
Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: 
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003); Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191, 221–23 (2008). 
 36.  See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 703 (2009) 
(noting how the ultimate goal of these names is to generate “prestige and . . . corral 
and preserve the majorities necessary to distribute her constitutional ideas”); Dan M. 
Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
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of the public do not have the interest or the aptitude to engage in 
sophisticated analysis of complicated jurisprudential debates, so the 
name attached to a position can be important.37 The name constructs 
what arguments are considered “on the wall” and “off the wall.”38 The 
mere fact that those in power are using this name and grouping 
arguments together with that name moves the jurisprudential debate in 
the direction of that name by dominating the public debate about legal 
issues.39 
Scholars such as Reva Siegel and Steven Teles have, for instance, 
identified the role that originalism plays as a name both to identify the 
problems with the Warren Court and to promote the alternative 
approach to judging that Republican presidents have supported.40 
Conservatives organized around originalism as the name for what the 
Warren Court lacked and what a new Reagan or Bush-dominated lower 
court judge or Supreme Court Justice would utilize.41 Justice Antonin 
Scalia argued that “it takes a theory to beat a theory,”42 and indeed 
liberals have debated and designed their own alternative names for what 
 
Cognition and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 74 (2011) 
(noting how these names serve as “signals that are received by intermediary groups — 
including politicians and media commentators — who then amplify and retransmit them 
to members of the cultural groups who look to them for guidance”). 
 37.  See Greene, supra note 36, at 710 (“So too the language of originalism, 
and particularly its appeal to scientific norms, satisfies a public demand for a digestible 
means of muting conflict over unresolved issues of constitutional law.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 38.  See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) 
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 30, 52 
(2005). 
 39.  See Teles, supra note 34, at 78 (noting the “capacity of senior 
government officials . . . to move otherwise marginal ideas into the intellectual 
mainstream”).  
 40.  See Siegel, supra note 35, at 192–93 (“Heller’s originalism enforces 
understandings . . . that were forged in the late twentieth century through 
[conservative] popular constitutionalism. . . . Heller respects claims and compromises 
forged in social movement conflict . . . in the decades after Brown v. Board of 
Education.”) (citations omitted). 
 41.  See JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 111–32, 162–70 (2005); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF 
THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 145 
(2008); Al Kamen & Howard Kurtz, Theorists on Right Find Fertile Ground: 
Conservative Legal Activists Exert Influence on Justice Department, WASH. POST, Aug. 
9, 1985, at A1. 
 42.  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 854 (1989) (“[I]t is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the 
nonoriginalists as to what this might be.”). 
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their judges and Justices would use as their guiding interpretive 
philosophy.43 
Judicial nominations play an important role in the construction and 
promotion of the name that the presidential administration wishes to 
promote. Nominations serve as a “focal point” permitting those inside 
and outside of an administration to coordinate themselves.44 Because of 
the stakes of judicial nominations, disparate interests will sit down 
across the table to debate and discuss their constitutional visions. These 
conversations can generate conflict about a name, but also move these 
interests closer towards a consensus about what that name should be. 
Stakeholders convened together recognize that without a name, their 
shared and separate interests will suffer. Indeed, this is a version of 
what happened during the Reagan Administration.45 Theorists outside of 
the government, lawyers inside of the government, and activists in 
between worked together to identify and agree on the originalism name 
as an initial frame.46 The converse of this is true, too: if an 
administration does not focus on generating a name, no focal point will 
be constructed, no multi-interest conversations will ensue, and no 
movement towards a naming consensus will result.  
Once agreed upon, this name also serves as a pre-commitment 
devise shaping other nominations.47 It is easier to monitor the president 
selecting nominees, the Senate evaluating nominees, and the interest 
groups promoting or opposing nominees once their shared 
jurisprudential commitment has a name. Consider, for instance, the 
reaction of conservative interest groups once President George W. Bush 
nominated Harriet Miers and these interest groups learned she was not 
using the name or arguments associated with their originalist 
preferences.48 
 
 43.  For an example of a book providing such names, see THE CONSTITUTION 
IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
 44.  See Richard H. McAdams, The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, in 
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 167, 167 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2d ed. 2011) 
(describing a focal point as “mak[ing] mutually salient a particular way of coordinating 
behavior”). 
 45.  See Teles, supra note 34. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some 
Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2003) 
(“When precommitting himself, a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure 
that at some later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have 
performed without that prior act. As I define it, precommitment requires an observable 
action, not merely a mental resolution.”) 
 48.  See Jonathan Riehl, Dissertation, The Federalist Society and Movement 
Conservatism: How a Fractious Coalition on the Right is Changing Constitutional Law 
and the Way We Talk and Think About It 1–5 (U. N.C.–Chapel Hill, 2007), 
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Judicial nominations also play an important role in promoting the 
jurisprudential vision. For lower court nominations, the nomination by 
a president of a candidate affiliated with that name and the affiliated 
jurisprudential vision signals to the legal community that the president 
is serious about promoting that vision. Advocates making their case to 
the administration on policy and legal matters will know of the 
jurisprudential philosophy that the administration support.49 Lawyers 
arguing before judges appointed by the administration will know what 
types of arguments that judge is more likely to find convincing.50 
Ambitious lawyers desiring a judicial or other nomination by the 
administration will know that familiarity with and usage of that name 
will help their chances.51 
For Supreme Court nominations, naming plays this promotional 
role in the eyes of the public as well.52 Critical interest groups aspire to 
hold senators and presidents accountable for their nominations behavior 
and their consistency with particular jurisprudential commitments.53 
With the exception of the rare Supreme Court decision that generates 
broad public debate—such as Roe v. Wade54 or Citizens United v. 
 
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:a046e8b1-4e0b-4af8-8a08-cea9e5cb58a7 
[https://perma.cc/ZSU9-WUWZ]. 
 49.  See Teles, supra note 34, at 66 (noting how originalism was an 
argumentative style used to persuade the Reagan Department of Justice of many 
initiatives). 
 50.  See Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on 
the Federal Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366 (2009) (finding that judges involved in the 
Federalist Society found certain types of arguments more convincing and deployed 
these arguments more frequently). 
 51.  See David Kirkpatrick, ’85 Document Opens Window to Alito Views, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/politics/politicsspecial1/85-document-opens-
window-to-alito-views.html [https://perma.cc/RDY6-55NP] (describing Samuel Alito’s 
application to the Justice Department and its discussion of these conservative legal 
touchstones). 
 52.  See Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Liberalism Had Little Presence in 
Sotomayor Hearings, WASH. POST (July 19, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071801787.html [https://perma.cc/SC4R-
6MDC] (quoting critics of the Sotomayor confirmation hearings, including former 
University of Chicago Law School Dean saying that the confirmation hearings “did 
serious damage to the cause of progressive thought in constitutional law” and 
progressive activist Doug Kendall saying that it was “a totally missed opportunity. . . . 
The progressive legal project hit rock bottom [last] week”). 
 53.  For empirical evidence that they do, see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. 
Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and 
United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial 
Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in 
Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992). 
 54.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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F.E.C.55—the public is paying far greater attention to the judicial 
system during a Supreme Court nomination than at any other moment.56 
The public does not pay great attention to the nuances of legal 
arguments, and so these confirmation hearings and the debates 
surrounding them generate a sense of what legal arguments are 
plausible and desirable. This sense is furthered if these arguments are 
framed together with a unifying name.57 The Senate confirmation 
hearing surrounding the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme 
Court, for instance, was seen as a public demonstration of the 
“intellectual seriousness” and salience of originalism.58 Chief Justice 
John Roberts described his role as that of an “umpire,”59 using a name 
that stimulated major public attention.60 Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 
remark earlier in her career that being a “wise Latina”61 could shape 
her jurisprudence likewise became a name that pervaded public 
discussion about her nomination. 
Republican presidents have tended more openly to locate and 
promote judges who embrace the name originalism.62 Republican 
 
 55.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 56.  See generally JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, 
COURTS AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 8, 11 (2009).  
 57.  See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the 
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 813 (2008) (“Framing theory 
emerged out of the recognition that one cannot organize in concert with others to alter a 
set of material conditions without an interpretation of one's interests or grievances and 
theories of how to advance them.”). 
 58.  See Matthew J. Franck, The Originalist’s Originalist, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 
28, 2013), https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/337354/original-originalist 
[https://perma.cc/S3MD-WHRP]. 
 59.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
55 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are 
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of 
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is 
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.”). 
 60.  See Bruce Weber, Umpires vs. Judges, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html 
[https://perma.cc/NVM5-H6WY] (“But since the Roberts hearings, the umpire 
metaphor has become synonymous, at least in public debate, with judicial restraint, the 
idea that judges are merely arbiters, that their job is not to set aside precedent and 
create law but to decide cases on the basis of established law.”). 
 61.  Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 
87, 92 (2002) (“I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her 
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who 
hasn't lived that life.”). 
 62.  See Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism 
for the Twenty-First Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 246 (2007) (“Although 
the practice of considering prospective judges’ views is far from a recent development, 
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presidents have indicated that they have a name for what they want 
from a judge or justice, and do not hide from that name.63 Individuals 
most prominently affiliated with generating that name are themselves 
nominated. Bork remains the most notable example of this. Bork was 
one of the theorists behind the creation of modern originalism.64 
President Ronald Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court, and he 
and his supporters referenced Bork’s support of this name and vision of 
originalism as part of the reason to support his nomination.65 During his 
confirmation hearings, Bork embraced originalism rather than avoiding 
it.66 
The lesson supposedly learned from Bork’s defeat was to hide 
legal views during hearings.67 Conservative nominees have therefore 
used the o-word less often explicitly, but still some of the time, and 
even when not using it directly have made arguments about judging that 
are part of the originalist project. 
During the second Bush Administration, nominees to the lower 
federal courts reflected and reinforced these naming efforts. Law 
professor Michael McConnell was one of the most influential originalist 
 
the Reagan/Meese reports stand out as unprecedented in their combination of great 
specificity, comprehensiveness, and sheer ambition.”). 
 63.  See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group’s 
Role in Screening Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/17/us/bush-would-sever-law-group-s-role-in-
screening-judges.html [https://perma.cc/E6AF-VX5F] (compiling statements by 
candidate and then President George W. Bush indicating his desire for “originalist” 
Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas). 
 64.  See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 239, 248 (2009) (“[S]cholars like Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, and political and 
judicial figures like Attorney General Edwin Meese III and then-Justice Rehnquist 
began to compose scholarly monographs articulating an intellectual defense of 
originalism in the 1970s and 1980s.”). 
 65.  See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK 
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (2007) (compiling statements of Bork supporters 
referencing him during his nomination as an originalist). 
 66.  See Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Hearings: Bork’s Testimony Ends with 
Panel Still Deeply Split, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/20/us/the-bork-hearings-bork-s-testimony-ends-with-
panel-still-deeply-split.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/QNS7-UEEV] (“For 
more than an hour, Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, engaged Judge 
Bork in a dialogue that ranged over many constitutional issues but focused on one that 
lies at the heart of the debate over Judge Bork’s confirmation: the nominee’s insistence 
that the original intent of the framers is the only valid guide in interpreting the 
Constitution.”). 
 67.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 919, 920 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 
(1994)) (noting the incentives after the Bork defeat for the Senate to “cease[] . . . 
engag[ing] nominees in meaningful discussion of legal issues”). 
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constitutional theorists in the academy at the time.68 During his 
confirmation hearing to be a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, he largely embraced his earlier views, 
even attacking Griswold v. Connecticut69 and Roe v. Wade by name.70 
McConnell provided an originalist defense of the invalidity of laws 
criminalizing polygamy.71 When Janice Rogers Brown was nominated 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, she likewise rejected Griswold as unmoored in originalist 
constitutional understandings.72 When Brett Kavanaugh—a former clerk 
to Bork—was nominated to the D.C. Circuit, he rejected any sense that 
the Constitution was living.73 
However, naming has been perceived as tactically problematic for 
the Democratic Party because it is uncooperative. The language of 
technical competence dominates public discourse about judicial 
nominations.74 Presidents, senators, and interest groups focus on the 
qualifications of nominees. Discussion of litmus tests related to a 
jurisprudential name are disavowed by those on both sides of the 
political aisle.75 When President Barack Obama introduced Elena Kagan 
 
 68.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1995) (arguing that “[a]n originalist approach in 
Brown would have paved the way for a more powerful judicial assault on the Jim Crow 
laws of the South”). See also David G. Savage, Liberals at Odds  
Over Appeals Court Nominee, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/16/nation/na-mcconnell16 
[https://perma.cc/CQ4T-SB9N] (“Yale law professor Akhil D. Amar, a liberal 
constitutional scholar, calls McConnell ‘America’s preeminent scholar of religious 
liberty.’ The University of Chicago’s Cass R. Sunstein, a liberal constitutional theorist, 
calls him ‘extraordinarily able, one of the best constitutional scholars in the country.’”). 
 69.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 70.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael McConnell To Be 
Circuit Judge For The Tenth Circuit, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 350, 383 (2002). 
 71.  Id. at 354, 377–79. 
 72.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Janice R. Brown, Of 
California, To Be Circuit Judge For The District of Columbia Circuit, Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 62 (2003). 
 73.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh To Be 
Circuit Judge For The District of Columbia Circuit, Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45 (2006). 
 74.  See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 56, at 11 (noting the salience of the 
argument “that the nominee ought to be judged primarily (if not exclusively) on 
legalistic criteria like judiciousness”). 
 75.  See Peter Baker, Obama Promises No ‘Litmus Test’ for Supreme Court 
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010, 11:38 AM), 
https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/obama-promises-no-litmus-test-for-
supreme-court-nominee/ [https://perma.cc/X99V-TQBF] (“President Obama said on 
Wednesday that he has no abortion litmus test as he selects a replacement for Justice 
John Paul Stevens.”).  
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as his Supreme Court nominee, he mentioned that she was “one of the 
nation’s foremost legal minds,” and he mentioned several times during 
the Senate’s consideration of her that she clerked for the Supreme 
Court.76 Names are supposed to signal partiality rather than the 
objectivity that presidents and senators are supposed to desire from 
their judicial nominees. With better filtration mechanisms, we all know 
that judges nominated by Democratic presidents tend to be more liberal 
than those nominated by Republican presidents,77 but to admit this and 
desire this openly can be an uncooperative political act. 
Democrats working on judicial nominations have argued that 
naming is therefore counterproductive because of the excessive cost 
generated by it. A judicial nominee who uses the name affiliated with a 
governing judicial philosophy—such as using the phrase “living 
constitutionalism”—places a bullseye on his or her back. Interest 
groups pull the “fire alarm”78 and notify relevant senators of the 
problematic nominee.79 Senators from the party of the president elected 
from swing states will be less inclined to support the nominee.80 
Senators from the opposing party are more likely to use the many 
 
 76.  See Remarks by the President and Elena Kagan at Reception Honoring 
Her Confirmation (Aug. 6, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2010/08/06/remarks-president-and-elena-kagan-reception-honoring-her-
confirmation [https://perma.cc/8P2Q-RSWV]; see also Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, 
Obama Picks Kagan, Scholar but Not Judge, for Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/us/politics/11court.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/U4CF-2Y2F]. 
 77.  See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive: For the First Time 
in a Century, the Supreme Court is Divided Solely by Political Party,  
SLATE (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_court
_s_partisan_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html [https://perma.cc/LCQ4-
SU8D] (“For the first time in a century, the Supreme Court is divided solely by 
political party.”). 
 78.  Nancy Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the 
Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation 
Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1029 (2008). 
 79.  See Nancy Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the 
Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation 
Process (unpublished manuscript) (“[W]e theorize that a principal function of interest 
groups in the lower court confirmation process is to act as ‘fire marshals’ for the 
Senate. By alerting the Senate to problematic nominees, interest groups aid the Senate 
in its constitutional mission under Article II to provide ‘advice and consent’ to the 
president on all life-tenured federal court nominations.”). 
 80.  See Jonathan P. Kastellec et al., Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation 
of Supreme Court Nominees, 72 J. POL. 767, 769 (2010) (reporting data finding that 
senatorial votes on Supreme Court nominations by senators are shaped by state-level 
public opinion). 
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procedural roadblocks that Senate rules afford senators from the 
minority party.81 
The argument is one sounding in the tactical benefits of avoiding 
candor.82 The same nominee presented to the Senate without using the 
name affiliated with his or her jurisprudential approach does not 
generate the costs imposed by political opponents. That nominee is 
therefore more likely to become a judge promoting that approach if he 
or she does not use the name affiliated with the approach when 
nominated. Nominees that have the potential to promote the name of 
the jurisprudence supported by the presidential administration would do 
better to disavow their preferences in favor of neutral, technocratic 
preferences.83 
The additional costs of naming are also harder to endure for a 
Democratic administration because of the supposed absence of political 
supports. Overcoming the additional vetogates put in front of a naming 
nominee requires constituencies who are willing to expend political 
resources on judicial nominations. Interest groups like the Judicial 
Crisis Network pledged to spend $10 million to secure the confirmation 
of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court.84 Republican primary voters 
want to hear from their candidates that they will nominate committed 
originalists to the bench.85 It is more challenging for the Democratic 
Party to mobilize such efforts on behalf of judicial nominations. 
The result is that the Obama Administration avoided this naming 
dynamic. Their first judicial nominee was David Hamilton, nominated 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U. 
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 735–36 (2003). 
 82.  See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1018 
(2008) (explaining that candor may “require that judges disclose everything they believe 
is relevant”). 
 83.  See President Obama Nominates Pamela Harris to Serve on the United 
States Court of Appeals, WHITE HOUSE (May 8, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/08/president-obama-
nominates-pamela-harris-serve-united-states-court-appeal [https://perma.cc/56NY-
BXEF] (“Throughout her career, Pamela Harris has shown unwavering integrity and an 
outstanding commitment to public service.”). 
 84.  See Burgess Everett, Conservatives Plan $10 Million High Court Ad 
Campaign, POLITICO (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:13 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/supreme-court-trump-schumer-conservatives-
233315 [https://perma.cc/Z5F5-DZ7F]. 
 85.  See Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary; Presidential 
Candidates Differ Sharply on Judges They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/08/us/2000-campaign-judiciary-
presidential-candidates-differ-sharply-judges-they-would.html [https://perma.cc/9U5D-
K6WC] (“Governor [George W.] Bush, after meeting with his advisers, decided to 
offer an explicit and hard-to-mistake signal and said that the justices he most admired 
were Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”). 
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by President Obama to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. Hamilton was selected precisely because he was 
not affiliated with any overarching jurisprudential agenda.86 The 
argument for not naming was one based in the logic of reciprocal 
cooperation: by naming someone not affiliated with any liberal vision, 
the goal of the Obama Administration was aiming to “reduce the 
partisan contentiousness of judicial confirmation battles of recent 
years.”87 Hamilton received the same treatment during his hearings and 
in the votes in committee and on the Senate floor that a candidate more 
known for and embracing naming would have received.88 The result 
was simple: a respected Seventh Circuit judge but one without any 
discernible benefit for an alternative vision of the law, and yet one who 
required the same expenditure of political effort and generated the same 
opposition as a naming judge. 
This pattern recurred often during the eight years of the Obama 
Administration. Nominees affiliated with the efforts to create a liberal 
alternative to originalism were rarely seriously considered, let alone 
nominated. When candidates like this were nominated, efforts were 
immediately made to distance themselves from any naming efforts. 
President Obama mentioned his desire for a justice that was guided by 
empathy, defined as “understanding and identifying with people’s hopes 
and struggles.”89 Justice Sotomayor, though, rejected the empathy label 
and any other liberal name or jurisprudential vision during her 
confirmation hearings.90 
 
 86.  See Lewis, supra note 19 (“The administration official said part of the 
reason for making the Hamilton nomination the administration’s first public entry into 
the often contentious field of judicial selection was to serve ‘as a kind of signal’ about 
the kind of nominees Mr. Obama will select. The official spoke on the condition of 
anonymity because the nomination had not been officially made.”); Toobin, supra note 
19 (“The hope was that Hamilton’s appointment would begin a profound and rapid 
change in the confirmation process and in the federal judiciary itself.”). 
 87.  Lewis, supra note 19. 
 88.  See David Fontana, Going Robe, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2009), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/71929/going-robe [https://perma.cc/JS8L-6UJF]. 
 89.  Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, WHITE HOUSE  
(May 1, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-
press-secretary-robert-gibbs-5-1-09 [https://perma.cc/Z7CN-9JPE] (statement of 
President Obama). 
 90.  See Goldstein & Kane, supra note 52 (“The hearings were a moment of 
history that liberals had awaited for 15 years: an opportunity for a Democratic 
president’s Supreme Court nominee to inject into the public dialogue fresh ideas about 
the Constitution and the law, beginning to recalibrate a court that has gravitated to the 
right. Yet Sotomayor did not articulate such a vision. In answering Cardin, and in 
scores of other times during four intense days in the witness chair, she eluded efforts of 
Democrats and Republicans alike to draw out any statement of liberal thought.”). 
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Goodwin Liu was actively involved in the American Constitution 
Society for Law and Public Policy and widely known as a scholar 
advocating progressive understandings of the Constitution. When he 
was nominated to the Ninth Circuit, The Washington Post proclaimed 
that his nomination “energized the left”91 because of these features of 
his background. During his nomination process, Liu’s supporters 
disavowed any sentiment like that—and Liu eventually did so himself. 
Liu rejected Justice Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” remarks.92 He rejected 
the idea of a “living Constitution.”93 He described himself as embracing 
the originalist name, stating that he is committed to “the original 
meaning of constitutional provisions where original meaning refers to 
‘the underlying principles that the Framers’ words were publicly 
understood to convey . . . .”94 He disavowed his own earlier argument 
that the Constitution might reflect a concern with social and economic 
inequalities.95 
The absence of naming also creates its own incentive structure 
within the field of judicial nominations. It is individually rational for 
nominees to avoid naming even if it is not collectively rational for 
presidential administrations to do so. The individual nominee who 
names simply makes themselves the subject of a fire alarm and 
increases their chances of being rejected for the federal bench. Interest 
groups opposed to the candidate are mobilized because of the unusual 
practice of a nominee engaging in naming. Interest groups can then 
successfully mobilize senators to oppose the candidate. The nominees 
who are confirmed are therefore those who do not name, which 
incentivizes the President to nominate other nominees who do not 
name. 
The point of this Essay is that this rejection of naming was 
tactically unwise. Refusing to name means that jurisprudence is being 
played using the other team’s rulebook. Lawyers and judges are left 
making arguments for their perspective using the linguistic and 
rhetorical tools developed for the opposing perspective. Lawyers and 
 
 91.  See Robert Barnes, Law Professor Goodwin Liu May Be Test Case for 
Obama Judicial Picks, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032102581.html [https://perma.cc/889N-
LPWU]. 
 92.  Responses of Goodwin Liu, Nominee to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the 
Ninth Circuit to the Written Questions of Senator Jeff Sessions 78, SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GoodwinLiu-QFRs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZYK-N469]. 
 93.  See id. at 6. 
 94.  Id. at 31. 
 95.  Id. at 3, 43. 
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judges are left to communicate to their political and public supporters—
let alone their legal ones—using the tools that are known to be utilized 
previously by their strongest opponents. Lawyers and judges desire to 
make arguments that can be considered “off the wall” because their 
perspectives have not been named and therefore elaborated. 
The failure to name during the judicial nominations process of the 
Obama Administration was a substantial lost opportunity. The past 
decade has featured the most sustained effort among liberal academics, 
judges, and justices to devise a name and a vision for their 
jurisprudence in at least a generation. The first year of the Obama 
Administration featured an edited book by Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel 
entitled The Constitution in 2020, featuring a series of essays meant to 
respond to the Reagan Administration’s blueprint The Constitution in 
2000.96 Justice Stephen Breyer authored a book in 200597 and then one 
again in 2011 meant to provide a liberal alternative to originalism.98 
Jack M. Balkin’s book Living Originalism in 2011 likewise aimed to 
provide scaffolding for a liberal jurisprudential vision.99 These attempts 
to provide a name and a vision did not feature in the remarks of 
President Obama’s judicial nominees, who instead largely either raised 
the names and visions associated with originalism and umpires, or 
responded to questions about them. Contrast that with the energy 
surrounding originalism in the 1980’s, and how that energy was 
manifested through confirmation hearings like those of Bork to the 
Supreme Court in 1987. 
This is not only a problematic state of affairs for a Democratic 
administration, but an unnecessary one. The evidence suggests that 
naming does not clearly elicit greater obstruction in a political 
environment as polarized as the present one. Supreme Court 
nominations are a unique political animal, but in the past era naming 
did not seem to matter that much, except on the extremes with Bork. 
An ideologically diverse cohort of Supreme Court Justices since 1955 
have been unanimously confirmed or confirmed with close to no 
 
 96.  THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 43, at 1–7. 
 97.  See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to 
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2006) (reviewing 
STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR CONSTITUTION (2005)) 
(noting how Breyer is attempting to articulate an alternative theoretical infrastructure). 
 98.  See David Fontana, Stephan Breyer’s “Making Democracy Work,” 
Reviewed by David Fontana, WASH. POST. (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/01/AR2010100103520.html [https://perma.cc/6RXG-
4XAF]. 
 99.  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 277–80 (2011). 
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opposition.100 Now, naming does not matter much because partisanship 
predicts Supreme Court confirmation votes rather than these votes 
being unanimous or close to it. Notice, for instance, the unified 
opposition by the Republican Senate to confirming the eminently 
qualified Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016. Garland had 
purposefully avoided affiliation with any efforts to name and promote a 
liberal jurisprudential vision.101 
For lower court nominations, naming likewise seems not to 
generate substantially greater opposition because partisanship is what 
matters. Nominees like David Hamilton—likewise focused on technical 
qualifications and not jurisprudential causes102—were opposed on a 
party-line basis. Hamilton was filibustered by Senate Republicans, 
voted out of committee on a party-line vote, and confirmed 59-39 (with 
only one Republican senator, his longtime supporter Richard Lugar, 
voting for him). 
Selecting nominees that engage in naming generates political 
supports that do not exist rather than relying on fixed political supports 
that do not exist. Voters follow the priming of the leaders of their 
political parties.103 Richard Nixon campaigned against the Warren 
Court and argued that judges should “interpret the law, not make the 
law.”104 The Reagan Administration made a particular view of the 
judicial role a central part of its agenda.105 George W. Bush told 
Republican primary voters the two models for a Supreme Court 
nominee in his Administration,106 and then-candidate Trump provided 
Republican primary voters with a list of twenty-one conservative judges 
he would consider for his Supreme Court nominee.107 After all, a 
 
 100.  Harry Blackmum, John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, and Antonin Scalia were unanimously confirmed, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Stephen Breyer faced minimal opposition. See Geoffrey Stone, Understanding 
Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 389–90 (2011).  
 101.  See Carl Hulse, Supreme Court Showdown Could Shape  
Fall Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-obama-
congress.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YTJ2-B22R]. 
 102.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 103.  For a nice summary, see Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public 
Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1024–25 (1990). 
 104.  See O’NEILL, supra note 41, at 96 (quoting President Nixon). 
 105.  See Teles, supra note 34. 
 106.  See Lewis, supra note 85 (“Governor [George W.] Bush, after meeting 
with his advisers, decided to offer an explicit and hard-to-mistake signal and said that 
the justices he most admired were Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”), 
 107.  See Adam Liptak, Trump’s Supreme Court List: Ivy League? Out. The 
Heartland? In., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-justices.html 
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Supreme Court with eight Republican nominees refused to overrule Roe 
v. Wade,108 and a Supreme Court with five Republican nominees found 
a right to same-sex marriage in the Constitution,109 so conservatives 
were already primed to care about judicial nominations. 
A candidate that names an approach to the law can create precisely 
the cognitive prime to generate similar political resources on the 
political left. A nominee known previously for his or her devotion to 
naming who then engages in naming during their confirmation process 
signals to their supporters the sincerity and seriousness of his or her 
devotion to the jurisprudential cause.110 The name itself that he or she 
uses can motivate and mobilize supporters more. The importance of 
“empathy” in judging and the benefits of a “wise Latina” on the bench 
are arguments that resonate with liberal styles of political reasoning and 
would motivate political liberals. If originalism was meant to motivate 
those who believe in literalism and those who believe in a better past 
wrongly distorted by the complicated present,111 then liberal names can 
motivate those who believe in the importance of diversity and inclusion, 
even when federal judges interpret legal texts. 
This naming by nominees can compensate for in motivation what 
has been the absence of salient Supreme Court harms to motivate the 
progressive cause. The most widely known Supreme Court cases are all 
progressive victories.112 Cases like United States v. Lopez113 did not 
generate the practical implications that conservatives desired and 
 
[https://perma.cc/3JQ8-4X9Z] (“When Donald J. Trump issued his final list of 21 
potential nominees to the Supreme Court in September, he made a vow. ‘This list is 
definitive,’ he said, “and ‘I will choose only from it in picking future Justices of the 
Supreme Court.’”). 
 108.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
 109.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015). 
 110.  Kahan, supra note 36, at 73 (noting how these names serve as “signals 
that are received by intermediary groups—including politicians and media 
commentators—who then amplify and retransmit them to members of the cultural 
groups who look to them for guidance”). 
 111.  See Greene, supra note 36, at 704–09 (highlighting the appeal of 
originalism); Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional 
Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (2011) (making similar arguments). 
 112.  See Paul Bedard, Poll: Roe v. Wade Most Well-Known Case, Only 34% 
Know ‘Bush v. Gore,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/poll-roe-v.-wade-most-well-known-case-only-34-
know-bush-vs.-gore/article/2573195 [https://perma.cc/6V4V-VAR2] (reporting that the 
most well-known conservative win in the Supreme Court was Bush v. Gore, known by 
only one-in-three respondents).  
 113.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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progressives feared.114 Citizens United v. F.E.C. might serve as the 
progressive Roe v. Wade in the future.115 
The Senate’s refusal to vote on Merrick Garland could be the 
appointments-related cause that mobilizes progressives in the way that 
Bork’s defeat mobilized conservatives. Garland, though, was not a 
mobilizing defeat in the way that Bork’s defeat was.116 Garland was a 
creature of the Washington legal establishment, rather than a lawyer or 
judge dedicating to branding and directing that legal establishment with 
naming or jurisprudence.117 
One other note on naming is in order. Naming can be effective 
even if the nominee engaged in the task does not have a realistic chance 
of being confirmed—because, for instance, the Senate is controlled by 
the party opposing the President (as it was for President Obama his last 
two years in office). The Bork nomination is a great example of this. 
Even in defeat, it consolidated conservative senators and interest groups 
behind originalism, and gave originalism a microphone louder than it 
had ever had previously. As Douglas NeJaime has written about 
litigation, there can even be a unique value in losing legal battles.118 
 
 114.  See Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001) (describing Lopez as “puppy 
federalism” because “like puppy love, it looks somewhat authentic but does not reflect 
the intense desires that give the real thing its inherent meaning”). 
 115.  See Matea Gold & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton’s Litmus Test for 
Supreme Court Nominees: A Pledge to Overturn Citizens United, WASH. POST (May 
14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/14/hillary-
clintons-litmus-test-for-supreme-court-nominees-a-pledge-to-overturn-citizens-
united/?utm_term=.86d49093264f [https://perma.cc/U9LB-49DN] (“Hillary Clinton 
told a group of her top fundraisers Thursday that if she is elected president, her 
nominees to the Supreme Court will have to share her belief that the court's 2010 
Citizens United decision must be overturned.”).  
 116.  See Editorial Board, Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/opinion/merrick-
garland-for-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/MRM3-ERCW] (“If you tried to 
create the ideal moderate Supreme Court nominee in a laboratory, it would be hard to 
do better than Judge Merrick Garland.”). 
 117.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Merrick Garland is a Deft Navigator of 
Washington’s Legal Circles, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/merrick-garland-obama-supreme-
court-
nominee.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=3C5AA676B671BB05FD4A29C54C2
AF505&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/6D94-7G7D] (“[I]t became clear over time that 
Mr. Garland was silently working out his arguments, processing facts and testing 
alternatives. Surrounded by overachievers in a city full of people clamoring to be 
heard, he was waiting until he had something to say.”). 
 118.  See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 
941 (2006) (“Sophisticated advocates may use litigation loss (1) to construct 
organizational identity and (2) to mobilize constituents.”). 
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II. NUMBING 
One other dimension of nominations accomodationism has to do 
with what I will call “numbing.” Not all potential or actual nominees 
are created equal. Presidential administrations and their supporters can 
use unusually provocative nominees with great power. An 
administration or its supporters can “plant” the name of a potential 
extreme nominee in the media,119 or actually nominate that candidate. 
This numbs the political system by generating nominee “extremeness 
aversion.”120 Political resources are directed towards opposing this 
nominee or ensuring that no additional similar nominees are selected, 
thereby directing oppositional resources away from other potential or 
actual nominees. Political elites and public opinion are cognitively 
distorted by the possibility of this nominee, making other nominees 
seem less objectionable. 
Many features of a potential or actual nominee can make him or 
her unusually provocative. Because of his or her youthful age, a 
nominee can be significant because he or she will serve on the bench 
for a long time and could be nominated to a higher position at a later 
time.121 When President George W. Bush nominated Miguel Estrada to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
in 2001, the fact that he was only thirty-nine years old made him an 
unusually threatening nominee to the Democratic Party.122 Potential or 
actual nominees that have a prior profile that is significant enough to 
give them a potentially outsized microphone from the bench can also be 
unusually provocative. Nominating Robert Bork to the Supreme Court 
in 1987—given his prior work on originalism—made him unusually 
 
 119.  See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why The Government 
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
512, 534 (2013) (“Plants are taken to be ‘authorized’ disclosures designed to advance 
administration interests and goals. Leaks are ‘unauthorized’ disclosures.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 120.  For a discussion of extremeness aversion more generally, see Itamar 
Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast 
and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281 (1992). See also Mark Kelman 
et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996) 
(considering extremeness aversion in the legal context). 
 121.  See Fontana & Schwartzman, supra note 11 (identifying the importance 
of nominating younger judges). 
 122.  See Mark Greenbaum, Double Take, NEW REPUBLIC (May 2, 2010), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/74728/double-take [https://perma.cc/CNF3-L7LC] (“The 
same qualities that had earned him a nomination—his youth, political leanings, and 
minority background—perversely worked against him: Fearing that Estrada would sit atop 
a list of possible Supreme Court picks once he became a judge, Senate Democrats waged 
a harsh two-year campaign against him.”). 
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provocative.123 Potential or actual nominees that promise to be more 
jurisprudentially extreme can also be unusually provocative. When 
President Trump was considering William J. Pryor for the Supreme 
Court in 2017, commentators described him as “the most polarizing” 
potential nominee because of many provocative comments over the 
years,124 including his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
when nominated to the Eleventh Circuit that Roe v. Wade had led to the 
“slaughter of millions of unborn children.”125 
Numbing has several tactical benefits. First, numbing directs 
resources towards the potential or actual extreme nominee and away 
from other nominees. Opposition interest groups conduct opposition 
research on that potential nominee to be able to demonstrate how 
extreme that potential nominee is.126 Opposition interest groups solicit 
contributions from their supporters by mentioning their efforts to 
prevent and/or defeat that nominee. Senators from the opposing party 
inform the administration of the problems with such an extreme 
nominee. The media features stories documenting the extreme 
jurisprudential perspectives of the potential nominee, and get prominent 
sources on the record to state that this potential nominee is extreme. 
Meanwhile, other potential nominees benefit from the resources 
expended on the extreme nominee by not facing the same degree of 
scrutiny. Opposition interest groups have not compiled the dossier on 
or motivated their supporters to oppose other nominees. Senators have 
not signaled to the administration their sentiments on other nominees, 
leaving an administration capable of claiming less opposition for that 
nominee. Media coverage of other nominees explicitly or implicitly 
contrasts them with the more extreme nominee. 
 
 123.  See Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1164, 1164 (1988) (“[W]hen judged by normal personal and professional criteria, 
Robert Bork is among the best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any 
other era.”). 
 124.  See Kimberly Kindy, Pryor: Perhaps the Most Polarizing Supreme Court 
Justice Possibility, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/pryor-perhaps-the-most-polarizing-supreme-
court-justice-possibility/2017/01/28/f25bb7e2-e4ae-11e6-ba11-
63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?utm_term=.fb1ef15d8eda [https://perma.cc/VKL6-LGXG]. 
 125.  See Opinion, Beyond the Pale, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/23/opinion/beyond-the-pale.html 
[https://perma.cc/RR7L-J44M]. 
 126.  See Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 79 (“[W]e theorize that a 
principal function of interest groups in the lower court confirmation process is to act as 
‘fire marshals’ for the Senate. By alerting the Senate to problematic nominees, interest 
groups aid the Senate in its constitutional mission under Article II to provide ‘advice 
and consent’ to the president on all life-tenured federal court nominations.”). 
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Second, numbing shapes elite and public sentiments towards the 
actual or potential nominee. Political attention rarely focuses on judicial 
nominees, particularly for the lower federal courts. Interest groups 
sound the “fire alarm” that the nominee is extreme.127 When these same 
citizens hear that the fire did not transpire—that the extreme nominee 
was not nominated or that relatively few extreme nominees were 
selected—they are less concerned about the other nominees. After Bork 
was defeated, a conservative federal judge like Douglas Ginsburg did 
not seem as extreme.128 Likewise, after President Trump did not 
nominate Pryor, a conservative federal judge like Neil Gorsuch did not 
seem as extreme.129 
Numbing also has a signaling benefit for the president. It signals to 
relevant lawyers and judges what jurisprudential perspectives are “on 
the wall” and “off the wall.”130 Lawyers aspiring to judicial (or other) 
nominations in that administration is thereby authorized to move 
jurisprudentially towards the extreme nominee, since that extreme 
nominee was at least considered—and was possibly nominated—for a 
powerful federal judicial position. Empirical studies have demonstrated 
that judges behave strategically when desiring elevation, so the trickle-
down effects on state judges or lower federal courts seeking elevation 
could be substantial.131 
Consider, for instance, the situation surrounding George W. 
Bush’s nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit. Brown 
was described as manifesting “evidence of extremism.”132 Brown had 
described liberalism as flawed in the same way that slavery was.133 
While one or two senators will often attended many hearings for 
presidential nominees, senatorial attention to Brown was substantial. 
 
 127.  Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1026. 
 128.  See Robert Pear & Jeff Gerth, Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of 
Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/us/court-
choice-in-focus-a-portrait-of-ginsburg.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/FFK2-
FZ2W] (covering Ginsburg’s nomination by asking whether he is “another Bork” and 
quoting one expert as stating “on the social agenda, I think he’s no Bork”). 
 129.  See Kindy, supra note 124 (contrasting Gorsuch with Pryor by labeling 
Gorsuch not as “polarizing” as Pryor). 
 130.  See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (Or Fail To Change) 
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28 
(2005). 
 131.  See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Courting the President: How 
Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court, 60 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 30 (2016) (finding such effects). 
 132.  David D. Kirkpatrick, New Judge Sees Slavery in Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/09/politics/new-judge-sees-slavery-
in-liberalism.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LBJ8-PD7G]. 
 133.  See id. 
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Senator Dick Durbin from Illinois, one of the leaders of the Senate 
Democrats, attended her hearings with many prepared and complicated 
questions.134 Then-Senator Barack Obama made a speech from the 
Senate floor opposing Brown.135 The list of those on the record before 
the Senate opposing her nomination was enormous and unusual.136 
This distraction generated lesser scrutiny for other candidates the 
Senate was considering around the same time. Senate Democrats during 
the Bush Administration focused their opposition on provocative 
nominees like Brown and Pryor, and were forced to justify this 
obstruction by noting that “the Senate has confirmed dozens of judicial 
nominees with little or no debate.”137 Nominees that would normally be 
provocative sailed through the confirmation process—relatively 
speaking at least—because the system had been numbed by nominees 
like Brown and Pryor. Diane Sykes, later considered a strongly 
conservative federal judge on the Seventh Circuit, was confirmed 70-27 
without anywhere near the opposition while Brown and Pryor’s 
nominations were pending.138 Brett Kavanaugh, a young and talented 
Bush White House staffer, was nominated in January of 2006 with 
much fanfare and controversy.139 The opposition resources he consumed 
meant those resources were not directed at another young and talented 
nominee, Neil Gorsuch—later to be nominated to the Supreme Court—
who sailed through on a voice vote. 
 
 134.  Judgment Call: The Nomination of Justice Roger Brown; The Economist’s 
Bill Emmott; Faith and the Law; Polio, MOYERS & CO. (Oct. 31, 2003) 
http://billmoyers.com/content/judgement-call-economist-bill-emmott-wendy-
kaminer2faith-law-polio/ [https://perma.cc/R74F-DH8D]. 
 135.  151 CONG. REC. S6,178–80 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Obama). 
 136.  See id. at S218. 
 137.  See Carl Hulse & David Stout, Embattled Estrada Withdraws as Nominee 
for Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/04/politics/embattled-estrada-withdraws-as-nominee-
for-federal-bench.html [https://perma.cc/FDX8-XPM2]. 
 138.  See Kevin Russell & Charles Davis, Potential Nominee Profile: William 
Pryor (Expanded), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 10, 2017, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-william-pryor 
[https://perma.cc/3729-526F] (“President-elect Donald Trump mentioned . . . [Sykes] 
by name during a primary debate shortly after Scalia’s death . . . .”). 
 139.  See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Aide on Court Nominees Faces Fire Himself, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/28/us/bush-aide-on-
court-nominees-faces-fire-as-nominee-himself.html [https://perma.cc/SS6P-GGN5] 
(“So when Mr. Kavanaugh came before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday as 
a nominee himself for an appeals court post, no one was surprised when he was 
verbally batted around by the panel’s Democrats, who have complained that Mr. Bush 
is trying to tilt the nation's courts rightward.”).  
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Other actual nominees had written records that suggested a 
jurisprudential perspective so provocative that they also distorted 
perspectives of the ideological positions of other nominees. When 
President Trump considered Pryor for the Supreme Court, progressive 
interest groups like the Alliance for Justice went on the record opposing 
Pryor specifically as ideologically extreme.140 The New York Times 
favorably contrasted Gorsuch with Pryor, whose “credentials, erudition 
and more muted stances” were discussed “as compared with Judge 
Pryor.”141 
For the cooperative political actor, numbing is problematic. A 
youthful nominee is meant to capture a scarce seat on the federal bench 
potentially for half a century, meaning that many later presidents—
including presidents of the opposing political party—will not have the 
opportunity to select their own preferred candidate for that seat. A 
prominent nominee will use his or her seat to criticize the 
jurisprudential perspective of the opposing party for decades to come. 
The standard statement issued by senators is that nominees will be 
evaluated to ensure they are within the mainstream,142 and so 
provocative nominees violate that announced standard. 
The logic, therefore, of rejecting numbing is that it generates 
additional political costs without any corresponding political benefits. 
Members of the opposing party are provoked by these nominees. Think 
of, for instance, the greater attention and opposition that Bork elicited. 
This is true of the lower federal courts as well. The Senate filibuster for 
lower court nominations was abolished by Senate Democrats because of 
its usage by Republicans against nominees like Liu. 
The Obama Administration therefore largely rejected the numbing 
strategy, purposefully, and from the beginning of its time in office.143 
Nominees like Hamilton were put forward because they were not 
extreme. In his second term, President Obama did utilize numbing 
more frequently. Nina Pillard was nominated to the D.C. Circuit the 
same day and at the same ceremony as the more establishment 
Washington lawyer Patricia Millett and sitting federal judge Robert 
 
 140.  See Kindy, supra note 124 (contrasting Gorsuch with Pryor by labeling 
Gorsuch not as “polarizing” as Pryor).  
 141.  See Michael D. Shear & Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Pick is 
Promised. A Political Brawl is Certain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/supreme-court-nominees-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z29Z-LDJN]. 
 142.  See The Latest: White House Plans Major Outreach by Gorsuch, DENVER 
POST (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:40 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/31/trump-neil-
gorsuch-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/6ACD-JLZC] (quoting Senate Minority 
Leader Charles Schumer, D-NY). 
 143.  See Lewis, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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Wilkins.144 Pillard immediately galvanized opposition from 
conservatives, thereby distracting attention from Millett and Wilkins.145 
The tactical merits of Obama Administration’s reticence to engage 
in numbing more often are questionable. The political costs of a 
provocative nominee are not necessarily any greater than the political 
costs of any nominee. Senate opposition to candidates can be based on a 
manufactured sense that a judicial nominee is provocative, even if he or 
she is not. The opposition to Liu, for instance, was based on a sense 
from his scholarly writings that he could be more aggressive as a 
progressive judge.146 His age (thirty-nine at the time of his nomination) 
and his political connections (he was a co-author of an article with 
Hillary Clinton147) suggested a potentially influential judge who could 
later be elevated to the Supreme Court. David Hamilton, by contrast, 
was selected by President Obama precisely because he did not seem 
provocative.148 However, conservative groups described him as having 
a “pretty clear leftist record” and labeled him the first pro-abortion 
judicial candidate nominated by President Obama.149 
Meanwhile, the political supports behind the President’s nominee 
can be even greater with a candidate meant to numb the opposition. 
Political supports are often built in support of or opposition to cases—
 
 144.  Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Judicial Picks Set the Stage for a 
Battle in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obama-to-name-3-to-top-appeals-court-
in-challenge-to-republicans.html?hp [https://perma.cc/3A2L-QS7S]. 
 145.  See Sergio Munoz, Working Moms’ Family Planning is Extreme and 
Radical: Right-Wing Attacks on Judicial Nominee Jump to Fox, MEDIAMATTERS (Nov. 
25, 2013, 5:43 PM), https://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/11/25/working-moms-family-
planning-is-extreme-and-rad/197053 [https://perma.cc/WFP4-3UUU] (quoting Carrie 
Severino of the conservative Judicial Crisis Network stating that “Nina Pillard is 
probably the most extreme judge that has been nominated for this court and possibly for 
any court in the country”); see, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 20 (reporting that “White 
House sources” had “figured [Pillard] . . . would be a sacrificial lamb, a scalp 
Republicans could claim while confirming Millett, an uncontroversial appellate lawyer, 
and hopefully Wilkins, an African-American judge who had been confirmed 
unanimously to the D.C. district court in 2010”). 
 146.  See Robert Barnes, supra note 91 (“[Liu] is an outspoken advocate of 
liberal causes, including same-sex marriage and affirmative action.”). 
 147.  See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Goodwin Liu, Separation Anxiety: 
Congress, The Courts, and The Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 439 (2003). 
 148.  See Toobin, supra note 19 (“Hamilton had been vetted with care. After 
fifteen years of service on the trial bench, he had won the highest rating from the 
American Bar Association; Richard Lugar, the senior senator from Indiana and a 
leading Republican, was supportive; and Hamilton’s status as a nephew of Lee 
Hamilton, a well-respected former local congressman, gave him deep connections.”). 
 149.  See Steven Ertelt, President Barack Obama Makes First Pro-Abortion 
Judicial Pick in David Hamilton, LIFENEWS (Mar. 17, 2009, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2009/03/17/nat-4920/ [https://perma.cc/8G9Q-BS7X]. 
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such as Roe v. Wade—but also in response to nominees like Robert 
Bork. Just like a plaintiff like James Obergefell or Lily Ledbetter, a 
provocative nominee puts a face and a story on a perspective on the 
law. So, for instance, the nomination of Liu, according to The 
Washington Post, “energized the left.”150 Newspapers reported his 
inspiring personal story,151 just as they had done about Miguel Estrada 
(the Bush D.C. Circuit nominee) nearly a decade earlier.152 The 
provocative nominee provides additional political resources, rather than 
minimizing them. 
Consider public opinion regarding the nomination of Merrick 
Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016. Garland was not the 
jurisprudentially transformative figure that Bork was or another 
nominee could have been. The refusal of Senate Republicans to 
consider his nomination, though, made him a cause celebre. 
Republicans had long been a party more focused on judicial 
nominations. Polling during the 2016 presidential election, though, 
found that members of both parties agreed almost equally with the 
statement that it “was very important to them personally” what 
happened with the opening on the Supreme Court created by the 
untimely death of Justice Antonin Scalia.153 
III. NUMBERS 
Another effective but aggressive strategy in nominating judges that 
remained relatively under-utilized during the Obama Administration 
compared to the Bush Administration was simultaneously to nominate 
large numbers of federal judges simultaneously.154 The numbers 
 
 150.  Barnes, supra note 91. 
 151.  See id. (“Born to Taiwanese immigrants, he learned English at schools in 
the South before attending Stanford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, and Yale Law 
School. He clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, worked in the Clinton 
administration and became active in education reform. Liu won a distinguished teaching 
award at the University of California's Berkeley School of Law and was promoted to 
associate dean.”). 
 152.  See Hulse & Stout, supra note 137 (referencing Estrada as “[a] Honduran 
immigrant and a graduate of Harvard Law School”). 
 153.  See GARLAND NOMINATION TO SUPREME COURT GETS POSITIVE REACTION 
FROM THE PUBLIC, PEW RES. CTR. (2016), http://www.people-
press.org/files/2016/03/3-28-2016-Supreme-Court-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ACD-
VY9Y]. 
 154.  This point is essentially about the nomination of lower court judges. 
President Obama nominated two Justices to the United States Supreme Court, but these 
nominations could not have been simultaneous because Justice John Paul Stevens did 
not resign until after Sonia Sotomayor had been confirmed. See Letter from John Paul 
Stevens, Supreme Court Justice, to Barack Obama, President (April 9, 2010), 
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strategy is one more applicable to the nomination of judges below the 
level of the Supreme Court. Discussions about judicial nominations 
focus almost exclusively on the total number of federal judges 
nominated by a President.155 The distribution of these nominations 
across political time is also important. Presidential administrations that 
nominate larger volumes of judges simultaneously generate greater 
oversight costs for the opposing party in the Senate and their supportive 
interest groups. Scarce political capital for the opposing party is 
depleted rapidly and substantially by more nominees, while political 
capital in support of these nominees is ready and potentially increased 
because of more nominees. Larger volumes of simultaneous nominees 
also generate pressure to confirm some significant number of these 
nominees, so as to blunt any problematic narrative about Senate 
obstruction. 
The scarcity of political resources is a definitional feature of 
political life. The expenditure of political resources generates both a 
direct cost and an opportunity cost taxing these scarce resources. 
Political actors only have so many resources to investigate a policy and 
decide their position on that policy. Political actors only have so many 
resources to persuade other stakeholders of their position on that policy. 
Political actors only have so many resources to generate public attention 
for and move public opinion towards their position on that policy. 
Scarcity means that resources invested in one policy dimension can 
become asset-specific resources, not readily transferable to deploy to 
address some other policy dimension.156 
Scarcity can be a particular challenge for those in political 
opposition because of the first-mover advantage of many of those in 
power.157 When a political actor proposes a policy, it is often the 
 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/JPSLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ET-
MT5X] (“I shall retire from regular active service as an Associate Justice.”).  
 155.  See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filing the Appellate Court Vacancies, 17 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (2015) (“President Obama has named more judges than Presidents 
George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had at this juncture in their tenure, while courts of 
appeals currently have the fewest openings since 1990.”); Grunwald, supra note 20 
(“Obama has already appointed 329 judges to lifetime jobs, more than one third of the 
judiciary.”). 
 156.  See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International 
Relations, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144–45 (David 
A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (“Political actors develop investments, ‘specific 
assets,’ in a particular arrangement—relationships, expectations, privileges, knowledge 
of procedures, all tied to the institutions at work. . . . [This] helps to explain 
institutional persistence. [A]ctors . . . have incentives to protect their investment by 
opposing change.”). 
 157.  See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of 
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999) (“[P]residents are 
particularly well suited to be first-movers . . . . The other branches are then presented 
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culmination of an investment of substantial resources in the 
development of that policy. That initial investment has yielded 
epistemic and stakeholder infrastructure to defend that policy once 
announced. The opponent of that policy, meanwhile, is put on the 
defensive, left to generate and consolidate his or her resources 
immediately or face rapid defeat and/or claims of obstruction of the 
policy. The political science literature about the power of setting the 
agenda, for instance, finds unsurprisingly that those in power set the 
agenda in a way that leaves the opposition disadvantaged.158 Because of 
the scarcity of their political resources, opponents are usually left 
pulling the “fire alarm” for only the most problematic of political 
actions engaged in by the majority.159 
Judicial nominations are susceptible to this same logic of scarcity 
in opposition. The primary opposition to the president’s judicial 
nominations within government come from members of the opposing 
party on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The docket of that committee 
is sufficiently large that judicial nominations are just one small part of 
the issues that members of that Committee are considering.160 There are 
only roughly nine senators and maybe double that number of lawyers 
working for those senators for the opposition party on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. There are interest groups active on judicial 
nominations—such as the Alliance for Justice on the left and the 
Judicial Crisis Network on the right—but there are not many of them.161 
There are interest groups that focus on a range of issues, including 
judicial nominations, such as the AFL-CIO.162 For those working on 
 
with a fait accompli, and it is up to them to respond. If they are unable to respond 
effectively, or decide not to, the president wins by default. And even if they do 
respond, which could take years, he may still get much of what he wants anyway.”). 
 158.  For a discussion of the power of agenda-setting, see FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 159.  See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 
166 (1984) (defining “fire alarms” in conducing oversight as reviewing just the most 
problematic of actions). 
 160.  See Jurisdiction, COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/7JWL-M6X2] 
(defining committee jurisdiction as “providing oversight” and “consideration of 
nominations and legislation, resolutions, messages, petitions, memorials and other 
matters”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 161.  See Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1028 (listing some 
of the groups most actively involved in judicial nominations). 
 162.  See AFL-CIO, THE SENATE SHOULD DO ITS JOB ON  
FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2016), 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/174597/4155029/file/The%20Senate%20Shoul
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judicial nominations, it can be easier generating public attention related 
to a Supreme Court nomination,163 but not for lower court nominations, 
making the task of mobilizing a larger opposition to a nomination quite 
challenging. 
The first-mover advantage can also be large for judicial 
nominations. If one of the senators from the state of the judicial 
nomination is both from the opposing party and on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, then the opposition party will have advance notice of the 
nominee and an opportunity to prepare opposition to that nominee. 
Otherwise, the president and his or her supporters in the Senate will 
have extensive background information available to them about the 
nominee at the moment of the nomination, while opponents will be left 
scrambling to learn about the nominee. Because our federal judicial 
system is geographically distributed,164 Senate lawyers and supportive 
interest groups in Washington can be left researching a trial lawyer in 
Idaho nominated to the federal district court there. A nominee like 
David Souter or Harriet Miers leaves opponents scrambling.165 
A judicial nomination is often the culmination of a process of 
lining up supporters rather than the beginning of that process. Before 
announcing a nominee, the president’s staff will not just look into 
candidates from within the administration, but also line up supporters 
outside of the administration. Organizations like the Alliance for Justice 
or the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy are consulted prior 
 
d%20Do%20Its%20Job%20on%20Federal%20Judicial%20Appointments%20-
%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C97D-2FZW]. 
 163.  See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 56, at 71–72 (finding that 
approximately three-quarters of Americans reported that it was important that their 
senators vote “correctly”); James G. Gimpel & Robin M. Wolpert, Opinion-Holding 
and Public Attitudes Toward Controversial Supreme Court Nominees, 49 POL. RES. Q. 
163, 164 (1996) (reporting that senatorial vote on Supreme Court nominations shaped 
their vote total in subsequent elections); Kastellec et al., supra note 80 (reporting state-
level data finding effects on senatorial vote totals). 
 164.  See Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III 
Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 130 (2014) (“The 
Framers solidified this important relationship between the Article III judiciary and the 
states by providing in the Constitution that the Senate must approve the President’s 
judicial nominees.”). 
 165.  See Opinion, For David Souter, With Hope, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/27/opinion/for-david-souter-with-
hope.html?login=email [https://perma.cc/6ZHA-2UXU] (describing Souter as 
“[v]irtually unknown even to scholars”); see Timothy R. Williams, Bush Names 
Counsel as Choice for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/03/politics/politicsspecial1/bush-names-counsel-as-
choice-for-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/FQY6-8JB8] (“Ms. Miers . . . has 
never been a judge, and therefore lacks a long history of judicial rulings that could 
reveal ideological tendencies. Her positions on such ideologically charged issues as 
abortion and affirmative action are unclear.”). 
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to the selection of a nominee, often to brainstorm the names of potential 
nominees.166 President Trump’s list of twenty-one potential Supreme 
Court nominees was compiled with the assistance of several of these 
organizations,167 but this consultation often transpires prior to a 
nomination. When the White House releases the name of a judicial 
nominee, its supporters are already armed and ready for political battle, 
while its opponents have not even started to contemplate who to oppose 
or how to oppose them. 
If scarcity is a political reality related to judicial nominations, 
particularly for those in opposition, it is far from inevitable. There are, 
after all, only nine Justices on the Supreme Court and 874 Article III 
judges. President Obama inherited only fifty-nine openings on the 
federal bench when he became president in January of 2009.168 
President Obama only nominated ten judges or justices during the first 
six months of his Administration.169 The evidence suggests that the 
Obama Administration nominated fewer numbers of judges during their 
first six months as a willful attempt to signal respect to Republican 
Senators by making it easier for them to evaluate these judges.170 Fire 
alarms are only needed to respond to judicial nominations when there 
are so many fires that police patrols are impossible171—and there need 
not be many judicial nominations fires. 
Therefore, one means of making salient the resource scarcity of 
opposition to judicial nominees is to nominate a large number of 
candidates simultaneously because political capital rarely can be 
increased proportionally in response. Senate and interest group staffing 
cannot be increased substantially and immediately, since both tend to 
utilize fiscal year funding that could not be changed until the next fiscal 
year. This leaves finite number of staff members researching large 
numbers of nominees. Stakeholders within and outside of the Senate 
must be redeployed to focus on opposing the nomination. Meanwhile, 
those supportive of the nomination from within the administration, the 
 
 166.  See, e.g., Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1028 n.5; 
Scherer & Miller, supra note 50, at 367. 
 167.  See Liptak, supra note 107. 
 168.  Rucker & Barnes, supra note 2. 
 169.  Jeffery L. Viken, Roberto A. Lange, Irene C. Berger, Charlene 
Honeywell, Gerald E. Lynch, Andre M. Davis, David Hamilton, Beverly B. Martin, 
Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., and Sonia Sotomayor. 
 170.  See Lewis, supra note 19 (“By naming judges one at a time, Mr. Obama 
is taking a markedly different approach from former President George W. Bush, who 
held a ceremony on May 9, 2001, in the Rose Garden to present his first 11 choices for 
appeals court seats. The ceremony provided a political air to the nominations, most of 
which went to prominent conservatives.”). 
 171.  See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 159, at 166 (defining police 
patrols as comparatively “centralized, active and direct”). 
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Senate, the interest group community, and the home state of the 
nominee have been mobilized and are prepared with their justifications 
for the nominee.  
Depleted political resources can be replenished over time. 
Opposition research that could not be done on a nominee one week can 
be done the next week. Interest groups that cannot be convened one 
week can be convened the next week. The simultaneous strategy, 
though, prevents that from transpiring. 
Multiple simultaneous nominations also place pressure on the 
opposing party in the Senate to confirm some of these nominees.172 The 
more nominees being held up in the Senate at any given time, the easier 
it is for the president and the media to target the opposing party for 
playing politics with judicial nominations.173 This leaves the opposition 
party with an undesirable choice. The opposing party in the Senate can 
spend few resources to target each nominee, or a lot of resources to 
target a few nominees. If it pursues the first course of action, it will 
struggle to defeat any nominee because not enough opposition will 
notice the nomination and mobilize against it. If it pursues the second 
course of action, it will mean that the rest of the nominees—who could 
also be provocative—will more easily be confirmed as a result of the 
absence of opposition. 
President George W. Bush utilized the simultaneous nominations 
strategy many times. He nominated eleven judges to the courts of 
appeals on one day in September of 2001.174 Included within that list 
were several notable conservative judges.175 He nominated five to the 
appellate courts on the same day in January of 2003 and two more 
 
 172.  See Micah Schwartzman, Not Getting Any Younger: President Obama’s 
Penchant for Older Judges Scuttled Goodwin Liu, SLATE (May 26, 2011, 6:04 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/not_getting_an
y_younger.html [https://perma.cc/458D-AVLX] (“For example, had they been isolated 
cases, it is doubtful that Janice Rogers Brown, William Pryor, or Priscilla Owen would 
have been confirmed. But there was safety in numbers. With a large group of 
controversial nominees, some of them were bound to make it.”). 
 173.  Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Senate Makes Progress to Fill 
Judicial Vacancies (May 8, 2014), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-makes-
progress-to-fill-judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/3UJP-4SVZ] (“Today, there are 74 
judicial vacancies throughout the country. At the same point under President Bush in 
May 2006, there were 50 judicial vacancies.”). 
 174.  See Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships Today, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/09/us/bush-to-nominate-11-to-
judgeships-today.html [https://perma.cc/3UJP-4SVZ].  
 175.  See id. (“The first nominees, 11 candidates for the federal appeals courts, 
include several outspoken conservatives who are committed to profound change on 
issues like the separation of church and state and increasing states’ rights.”). 
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within the next month.176 In February of 2005, he nominated six to 
appellate courts.177 
Senate Democrats were left with limited resources to respond. 
When John Roberts was nominated to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2003 as part of the 
simultaneous nominations of that year, it was known at the time that 
was a potential future Supreme Court nominee.178 Because of the 
volume of nominees, though, Senate Republicans successfully moved to 
have Roberts testify the same day before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee as several other nominees.179 Other prominent Bush 
nominees—such as Neil Gorsuch, President Trump’s Supreme Court 
nominee—did not receive much attention by overwhelmed Senate 
Democrats and were therefore unanimously confirmed.180 
By contrast, the Obama Administration largely avoided 
simultaneous nominations.181 There was only one day during his first 
term when he nominated more than two judges to a federal court of 
appeals.182 The moments when the Obama Administration did attempt 
this strategy illustrated the merits of the strategy. On June 4, 2013, 
President Obama stood “[i]n a formal Rose Garden ceremony normally 
 
 176.  See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Selects Two for Bench, Adding Fuel to Senate 
Fire, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/26/us/bush-
selects-two-for-bench-adding-fuel-to-senate-fire.html [https://perma.cc/2SY4-S2BK] 
(“President Bush escalated his fight with Senate Democrats over judicial nominations 
today by naming two [more] candidates for judgeships for the federal appeals court in 
Washington, widely regarded as second in importance only to the Supreme Court.”); 
Opinion, Steamrolling Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/06/opinion/steamrolling-judicial-nominees.html 
[https://perma.cc/SF9X-ZM8H] (“The new Senate Republican majority is ushering in 
an era of conveyor-belt confirmations of Bush administration judicial nominations.”). 
 177.  Bush Administration Nominations by Date, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/nominations/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3ZB-F47F] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 178.  See Lewis, supra note 174. 
 179.  See Opinion, supra note 176 (“Republicans on the Judiciary Committee 
held a single hearing last week for three controversial appeals court nominees.”). 
 180.  See Carl Hulse, In Neil Gorsuch’s Confirmations, Parsing the Meaning of 
“Yes,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-
confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/GX8H-ZC4W] (“Republicans on the Judiciary 
Committee held a single hearing last week for three controversial appeals court 
nominees.”). 
 181.  See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 19 (“By naming judges one at a time, Mr. 
Obama is taking a markedly different approach from former President George W. 
Bush, who held a ceremony on May 9, 2001, in the Rose Garden to present his first 11 
choices for appeals court seats. The ceremony provided a political air to the 
nominations, most of which went to prominent conservatives.”). 
 182.  Shear & Peters, supra note 144. 
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reserved for Supreme Court hopefuls and prominent cabinet 
nominees.”183 He nominated three candidates for the D.C. Circuit, at 
least one of whom (Cornellia T.L. Pillard) was more controversial.184 
This was immediately perceived by Senate Republicans as a non-
cooperative act.185 All three were confirmed,186 with Pillard absorbing 
the brunt of the attacks by Republican senators and with only limited 
resources remaining to evaluate and attack the other two D.C. Circuit 
nominees.187 
The cooperative behavior of nominating fewer numbers of judges 
did not generate a differential and more cooperative response by Senate 
Republicans. Hamilton was the only Obama nominee to the court of 
appeals for a few weeks and attracted lots of attention and opposition 
from Republican senators.188 When more judges are nominated 
simultaneously, the same motivation to oppose these nominees is 
present—but the ability to do so is less pronounced because of resource 
scarcity. If anything, then, simultaneous nomination of large numbers 
of nominees reduces political opposition. The motivation to oppose is 
constant, but the opportunity to do so is limited. 
Simultaneous nominees can increase the political capital available 
to the president and his or her nominees. For political supporters, 
simultaneous nominations of large numbers of nominees is a signal that 
the president is serious about the cause of judicial nominations and 
serious about pursuing that cause. The president is signaling that his or 
 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  See id. (“Ms. Pillard’s background may prove a bit more problematic. 
She served in the Clinton administration and has worked at the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, two well-known 
liberal organizations.”). 
 185.  See id. (“There’s a culture of intimidation throughout the executive 
branch,” Mr. McConnell said after the president’s announcement. “There’s also a 
culture of intimidation here in the Senate.”). 
 186.  Cornelia T.L. Pillard, U.S. CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+NP 
[https://perma.cc/XNC3-K2G5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Robert L. Wilkins,  
U.S. CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+RLW 
[https://perma.cc/6VVX-F699] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Patricia A. Millett,  
U.S. CT.  APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+PAM 
[https://perma.cc/F9BB-6XLC] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 187.  Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Judicial Picks Set the  
Stage for a Battle in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obama-to-name-3-to-top-appeals-court-
in-challenge-to-republicans.html?hp [https://perma.cc/PN3A-2W7K]. 
 188.  Jeremy W Peters, Republicans Again Reject Obama Pick for Judiciary, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/us/politics/senate-
blocks-judicial-nominee-with-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/9BM9-RAC3]. 
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her administration has been expending substantial political resources to 
locate large numbers of nominees, and is willing to expend these 
resources to ensure these nominees are confirmed. This cost endured by 
the administration makes simultaneous nominations a credible signal of 
seriousness on the issue.189 Interest groups are therefore more likely to 
expend their limited resources pushing for these nominees. Meanwhile, 
supporters of the president hear from and are informed by him or her 
that this is an important issue, which stimulates supporter interest and 
activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Ronald Reagan became President of the United States in 
1981, the Democratic Party has been playing defense on judicial 
nominations. The Republican Party made finding their most talented 
legal minds and putting them on the federal bench a major priority. 
Many of the great theorists of the jurisprudential right—Michael 
McConnell, Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia—went from the academy 
to the bench.190 Many of the great lawyers of the jurisprudential right—
John Roberts, Jeffrey Sutton—went from practice to the bench.191 These 
superstars before the bench became superstars on the bench, writing 
opinions that are widely known,192 and sending their law clerks on to 
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become the next generation of elite lawyers and law professors.193 
Presidents Clinton and Obama, both former law professors, did not put 
together the nominations record to match what happened when a 
Republican was in the White House. 
Lawyers on the left watched with disappointment, but also with 
awe and admiration. Conservatives had admired the liberal legal 
movement’s success in the Warren Court years inside and outside of 
court, and aspired to create the organizational structure to emulate it. 
Now, a generation later, liberals feel the same.194 They wanted their 
own president to transform the federal courts in their favored direction. 
Just as the Federalist Society looked to liberals a generation ago for a 
roadmap to success, Democrats have started to believe that identifying 
the triumphs of conservatives on judicial nominations is a good place to 
start.  
The argument of this Essay has been that the institutional practices 
of judicial nominations have generated a discrete list of political 
strategies that work better for presidents trying to maximize their 
nominations successes. These strategies feature certain common 
dimensions that mean that just as they worked for past Republican 
presidents, they could have worked for President Obama and can work 
for future Democratic presidents. The road to future nominations 
success for Democrats involves staying in the same lines that 
Republican presidents have created. 
Staying in those lines, though, involves a political ethos that has 
largely been lacking in the Democratic Party for at least a generation: a 
willingness aggressively to prioritize and push judicial nominations. 
President Obama’s limitations on judicial nominations were not the 
result of losing a brutal political fight, but of largely not starting one at 
all. The past several years have witnessed a resurgence of energy in the 
Democratic Party, and a desire to revisit political tactics. Regardless of 
the ideological preferences of voters or officials, there has been a 
gradual trend towards pursuing these preferences with a renewed 
intensity. Past institutional norms that Democratic Party leaders refused 
to flout have now been reframed as norms that can be leveraged 
tactically to achieve maximum outputs. With this motivation to engage 
in more aggressive political tactics, the next Democratic president could 
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have the opportunity to do what the past few Democratic presidents 
have not: use available and aggressive political strategies to create a 
federal bench that they find desirable. 
